Reference pricing in the presence of pseudo-generics by Gonçalves, Ricardo et al.
Reference pricing in the presence of pseudo-generics∗
Ricardo Gonçalves†
Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto)
Vasco Rodrigues
Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto)
Hélder Vasconcelos




We build on the analysis of Rodrigues et al. (2011) and look at the market impact of pseudo-
generics under two possible reimbursement mechanisms: reference pricing and fixed percentage
reimbursement. Reference pricing emerges as a preferable reimbursement mechanism, both from
a consumer’s perspective as well as from a welfare perspective, particularly when a pseudo-
generic is present.
JEL Classification: I18, L13
Keywords: pseudo-generics, reference pricing, reimbursement mechanisms
∗Financial support from Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (project PTDC/EGE-ECO/100296/2008) is grate-
fully acknowledged.
†Postal address: Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto), Rua Diogo Botelho,
1327, 4169-005 Porto, Portugal. E-mail: rgoncalves@porto.ucp.pt.
1
1 Introduction
As the patents of branded pharmaceuticals expire, generic competition becomes possible. The
producers of the branded pharmaceutical can also market a generic version of their branded prod-
uct, commonly known as pseudo-generics. Because such a strategy appears, at first sight, to be
unprofitable - generics typically have a much lower price than the branded pharmaceutical and,
thus, selling pseudo-generics could significantly reduce profit margins - Rodrigues, Gonçalves and
Vasconcelos (2011) analyse the potential for anticompetitive effects associated with the presence
of pseudo-generics in pharmaceutical markets. Their model assumes price-setting firms in a mar-
ket with vertical (between branded and generic pharmaceuticals) and horizontal differentiation
(between generics). They conclude that the presence of pseudo-generics raises the prices of all
pharmaceuticals as they become a tool for the branded producer to soften competition between
itself and generic producers.
This paper builds on Rodrigues et al. (2011) by considering a setting where a reimbursement
mechanism is in place, i.e. where the consumer does not bear the full price of pharmaceutical
products. We incorporate into the model two widely adopted reimbursement mechanisms: fixed
percentage reimbursement (FPR) mechanism and a reference pricing (RP) mechanism.1 Under a
FPR mechanism, the consumer supports a fixed percentage (copayment rate) of the pharmaceu-
tical’s price, whilst the government (or other third-party payers) is responsible for financing the
remainder. By contrast, under a RP mechanism, within each cluster of pharmaceuticals, a ‘refer-
ence’pharmaceutical is defined - typically a generic - and its price is defined as the ‘reference price’.2
The government’s contribution towards the purchase of pharmaceuticals is calculated on the basis
of that reference price, i.e. if a consumer decides to purchase a more expensive pharmaceutical,
the diference between that pharmaceutical’s price and the reference price is fully borne by him.
Naturally, reference pricing is only different from FPR when generic competition becomes possi-
ble, otherwise only one branded pharmaceutical exists which would automatically be the reference
pharmaceutical.
There is a large consensus in the literature regarding the merit of reference pricing. For instance,
Brekke et al. (2007) show that reference pricing leads to lower prices than FPR mechanisms. They
further show that although from a social welfare perspective reference pricing is equivalent to FPR
mechanisms, once a narrower welfare indicator - from a public payer’s perspective - is adopted,
which excludes firms’ profits, the former is clearly superior. Merino-Castelló (2003) also shows
that reference pricing enhances price competition and leads to significant reductions in the price
of branded pharmaceuticals. Whilst also acknowledging the potential benefits of reference pricing,
Miraldo (2009) notes that if firms anticipate the introduction of a reference pricing mechanism,
1For a detailed review of reference pricing, see López-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000).
2Several criteria could be used to cluster pharmaceuticals: chemical, pharmacological or therapeutic (Miraldo,
2009).
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they will optimally revise their prices upwards ahead of that introduction and thus significantly
limit its expected effectiveness. Nevertheless, Brekke et al. (2009) present empirical evidence of
significant price reductions for all pharmaceuticals following the introduction of reference pricing
in Norway.
In line with Brekke et al. (2007), we find that reference pricing, with or without the presence
of pseudo-generics, leads to lower prices and higher consumer surplus than FPR mechanisms. It
is particularly interesting to note that, under a FPR mechanism, pharmaceutical firms effectively
receive a public subsidy but consumers do not benefit from lower (effective) prices. By contrast,
under reference pricing, it is consumers who receive a public subsidy, which allows them to increase
their consumer surplus.
Moreover, adopting Brekke et al. (2007) narrower welfare measure - from a public payer’s
perspective - it is shown that RP fares better than FPR. In contrast to Brekke et al. (2007),
however, we also explore a scenario where pseudo-generics are present. By so doing, we uncover
additional results. In particular: (i) as mentioned, RP yields higher consumer surplus than FPR,
but the difference between the two is shown to be larger when a pseudo-generic is present in the
market; and (ii) RP is shown to be particularly advantageous, from a welfare viewpoint (public payer
perspective), when a pseudo-generic is present. This result is inevitably linked to Rodrigues et al.
(2011), because in the presence of a pseudo-generic, firms’profits and hence total pharmaceutical
expenditure are higher. As firms, under a FPR mechanism, ‘mark-up’ their prices and profits
relative to a RP mechanism, this ‘mark-up’is larger, in absolute terms, when a pseudo-generic is
present. By eliminating this ‘mark-up’, reference pricing brings about a larger increase in consumer
surplus and welfare.
This paper has the following structure: section 2 describes the base model; sections 3 and 4
analyse the two reimbursement mechanisms in a setting where a pseudo-generic is absent or present
respectively; section 5 presents the paper’s main results and section 6 concludes.
2 Model
The model is based on Rodrigues et al. (2011). We assume two firms, an incumbent (I) and
an entrant (E), which compete by simultaneously setting prices. The incumbent sells a branded
pharmaceutical product (denoted by b) and may also sell a generic, non-branded, variety of that
product - a pseudo-generic denoted by pg. The entrant only sells the generic variety (denoted by
g). B, PG, and G refer to quantities (or demand functions) of these varieties.
Branded and generic varieties are assumed to be vertically differentiated in the eyes of con-
sumers: consumers have a higher reservation price for the branded variety (β) than for the generic
(γ), i.e. β > γ > 0. Horizontal differentiation is also assumed, whereby uniformely distributed con-
sumers must decide on their preferred product along an Hotelling interval [0, 1] , where the entrant
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is located at 0 and the incumbent at 1, and where the disutility of consuming a generic is assumed
to be linear in the distance to the preferred variety, with slope t > 0. Consumers will purchase a
unit if their surplus (CS) is positive and none otherwise. If the surplus is positive for more than
one product variety, the consumer will choose the variety which yields the highest surplus:
CSi =

β − p̂b if she buys b
γ − p̂k − t× |fj − ci| , k = g, pg if she buys g or pg
0 otherwise
(1)
where (p̂b, p̂pg, p̂g) is the price vector relevant to consumers (which we refer to as effective prices)
and ci denotes consumer i’s type, i.e. ci measures the distance between consumer i’s location and
the left endpoint of the unit interval, and fj denotes firm j’s location.
We analyse two possible reimbursement schemes: a fixed percentage reimbursement (FPR)
mechanism, where consumers must pay the same percentage (copayment rate), θ ∈ [0, 1] , of their
desired product varieties’headline price; and a reference pricing (RP) mechanism, where the con-
sumer’s copayment is based on the price of the “reference”pharmaceutical, typically the generic.
In order to highlight the differences between these two reimbursement mechanisms, under the FPR
mechanism the effective prices are given by:
p̂FPRk = p
FPR
k − (1− θ) pFPRk = θpFPRk , k = b, pg, g (2)
We define pFPRk (k = b, pg, g) to be the headline prices set by firms when the FPR mechanism
is in place. By contrast, under a reference pricing mechanism, the effective prices are given by (we




k − (1− θ) pRPg , k = b, pg
p̂RPg = p
RP
g − (1− θ) pRPg = θpRPg (3)
where pRPk (k = b, pg, g) are the headline prices set by firms when the RP mechanism is in place.
We will also refer to the no reimbursement (NR) scenario - the setting analyzed by Rodrigues et
al. (2011) -, whereby patients must support the headline prices in full; this is equivalent to setting
θ = 1 in equation (2) or (3). Finally, production costs are assumed to be zero and the total number
of consumers is set equal to 1, i.e. product quantities can be interpreted as market shares.
3 The market with no pseudo-generics
In this setting, we assume that the incumbent (I) does not sell a pseudo-generic, i.e. it only sells
the branded (b) variety, whilst the entrant (E) only sells the generic variety (g). In this case, the
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consumers’effective prices given by equations (2) and (3) do not include the pseudo-generic variety
(pg).
3.1 Fixed Percentage Reimbursement
The “marginal consumer”, cFPRb.g , who is indifferent between buying the branded (b) or generic (g)
pharmaceuticals is found by solving γ − θpFPRg − t× cFPRb.g = β − θpFPRb , which yields:
cFPRb.g =









represent the price vector. As the total number of consumers is





= 1− cFPRb.g = 1−







θ(pFPRb − pFPRg )− (β − γ)
t
(5)
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When no reimbursement (NR) mechanism exists, θ = 1 and we obtain the results of Rodrigues et




k , with k = b, g. Under a fixed percentage reimbursement scheme,
firms mark-up their headline prices in an inversely proportional manner relative to the copayment
rate: the higher is the copayment rate, the lower is that mark-up under a FPR mechanism. This
implies that the effective price paid by consumers is equal in both cases and therefore equilibrium
quantities are also the same, i.e. p̂FPRk = p̂
NR
k (k = b, g), B
FPR = BNR and GFPR = GNR.




j , j = B,G, i.e. firms also increase their profits in an inversely
proportional manner relative to the copayment rate. Headline prices, pb and pg, are lowest when
the patient’s copayment rate is maximal, i.e. when θ = 1. This result is similar to that of Brekke
et al. (2007).
Consumer surplus (CS) is given by the sum of the surplus of buying the branded and generic



















(β − γ)2 − 11t2 + 10βt+ 8γt
18t
(10)
Note that CS does not depend on θ : as outlined above, the existence of a copayment rate has
no impact on the effective prices consumers must face, p̂b and p̂g. Hence, the existence of a FPR
mechanism (through parameter θ) does not affect consumer surplus, i.e. CSFPR = CSNR.
Total profits, which are equivalent to total pharmaceutical expenditure, are given by:


















Government (or other third-party payers) expenditure with pharmaceuticals is a proportion
(1− θ) of total pharmaceutical expenditure:

















Parameter restrictions Two restrictions must hold for these results to be valid. Firstly,
0 < cFPRb.g < 1, i.e. both the branded and the generic varities are sold in equilibrium. c
FPR
b.g < 1 is
always verified, whilst for cFPRb.g > 0 to be verified, the following condition must hold:
β < t+ γ (13)
Secondly, β ≥ pFPRb , i.e. consumer surplus must be positive (in equilibrium) for both product
varieties. In order for this to be verified, the following must hold:
β ≥ 2t− γ
3θ − 1 (14)
These restrictions are similar to those of Rodrigues et al. (2011) in a setting where no reim-
bursement mechanism exists (i.e. θ = 1).3
3.2 Reference Pricing
When a reference pricing mechanism is in place, the marginal consumer, indifferent between pur-
chasing a generic or a branded pharmaceutical, is found by setting γ − p̂RPg − t× cRPb.g = β − p̂RPb ,
which yields:
cRPb.g =
(pRPb − pRPg )− (β − γ)
t
(15)
Notice that the marginal consumer in this case has the same location as the marginal consumer
when no reimbursement mechanism exists (which can be found by setting θ = 1 in equation (4)),
i.e. cRPb.g = c
NR
b.g . Therefore, demand and profit functions, as well as equilibrium quantities and
prices are equal in these two scenarios: pRPk = p
NR
k , with k = b, g. Notably, this result does not
depend on θ : regardless of the copayment rate, as long as the patient’s copayment is calculated on
the basis of the reference pharmaceutical - in this case the generic -, both firms will have incentives
to lower their prices to the levels which they would choose if a reimbursement mechanism did not
exist. To that extent, in the absence of price regulation of pharmaceuticals, reference pricing is
more successful in bringing about price competition than a FPR mechanism.

















(β − γ)2 − (5 + 6θ) t2 + (6θ + 4)βt+ (14− 6θ) γt
18t
(16)
Total profits are given by:
3For a graphical representation of these restrictions, see Rodrigues et al. (2011).


















Government expenditure is a proportion (1− θ) of the reference price for all pharmaceuticals:















Parameter restrictions As outlined earlier, two conditions must be verified: 0 < cRPb.g < 1
and β ≥ pRPb . In the first case, the same restriction outlined earlier must also hold: β < t+ γ. As
for the second case, the following must hold: β ≥ t− γ/2 (the RP mechanism is equivalent to the
NR mechanism, i.e. θ = 1 in the previous second restriction given by equation (14)).
4 The market with a pseudo-generic
When the incumbent, in addition to the branded pharmaceutical, also sells the pseudo-generic, let
fI ∈ (0, 1) represent its location.
4.1 Fixed Percentage Reimbursement




we find the location (cFPRg.pg ) of the consumer















= β − p̂FPRb we find the location (c
r,FPR
b.pg ) of the
consumer who is indifferent between the branded and pseudo-generic products (r indicates that
this consumer is located to the right of fI):


















be the headline price vector under a FPRmechanism. Demand




















































In this scenario, the incumbent produces both the branded and the pseudo-generic products.




























. Maximizing the former with respect to pFPRb and p
FPR
pg and the latter with respect
to pFPRg , we find the best-response functions which lead to the following Nash equilibrium prices
(the underscore is used to differentiate the equibrium prices, quantities and profits in the case with
























































t (41− fI (34− 11fI)) + 18 (1− fI) (β − γ) +






t (2 + fI)
2 (24)
As mentioned earlier, when no reimbursement (NR) mechanism exists, θ = 1. Similarly to





, with k = b, pg, g : headline prices are marked-up in
an inversely proportional manner relative to the copayment rate, which implies that the effective





k , k = B,PG,G.
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9 (β − γ)2 + (18β + 54γ) t− 18 (β − γ) tfI −
(





Notice that CSFPR does not depend on θ because effective prices paid by consumers do not
depend on the existence of a copayment rate. Hence, CSFPR = CSNR.
Total profits are given by:









t (49− fI (26− 13fI)) + 18 (1− fI) (β − γ) +




Government expenditure is given by:





t (49− fI (26− 13fI)) + 18 (1− fI) (β − γ) +




Parameter restrictions Five conditions must hold for these results to be valid. Firstly,









t < β < γ +
7
3
(1− fI) t (28)
Secondly, cr,FPRb.pg > c
FPR
b.g and γ − p̂
FPR
pg
− tfI < γ − p̂FPRg , i.e. the pseudo-generic is sold in
equilibrium. The latter is satisfied provided p̂FPRpg > p̂
FPR
g
, which holds in equilibrium. The former
is satisfied provided:
fI > 2/5 (29)
If this condition holds, the first inequality in equation (28) is always satisfied for any β > γ.
Thirdly, fI < c
r,FPR
b.pg < 1, so that the branded product is sold in equilibrium. c
r,FPR
b.pg < 1 is
always satisfied, but in order for fI < c
r,FPR
b.pg the following must hold:










β < γ + (1− fI) t (30)
Fourthly, cFPRb.g > c
l,FPR
b.pg so that the pseudo-generic is sold in equilibrium. This is equivalent to
requiring that:









This condition is more restrictive than the second inequality in equation (28) and the inequality
in equation (30). In addition, this condition sets an upper boundary for fI , because by assumption
β > γ. Hence, for this assumption to hold, fI < 5/8. Together with equation (29), this implies that:
2/5 < fI < 5/8 (32)
Finally, all product varieties must provide positive surplus, which is equivalent to requiring that
β ≥ p̂FPR
b
. This is verified provided the following condition holds:
β ≥ 11t− 5tfI − 3γ
6θ − 3 (33)
Therefore, equations (31), (32) and (33) must hold for our results to be verified.6
4.2 Reference Pricing
It is straightforward to show that the location of consumer who is indifferent between the branded
and pseudo-generic products and between the pseudo-generic and the generic products is equivalent
to the NR scenario.7 Hence, equilibrium quantities, prices and profits are equal to those in that
scenario (namely pRPk = p
NR
k
, with k = b, pg, g, and the latter can be found by setting θ = 1 in
equation (22)).
Consumer surplus is given by:8
6With the exception of equation (33), all other restrictions are similar to those of Rodrigues et al. (2011), where
their graphical representation can also be found.
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9 (β − γ)2 + (18β + 54γ) t− 18 (β − γ) tfI −
(





Total profits are given by:









t (49− fI (26− 13fI)) + 18 (1− fI) (β − γ) +




Recall that total profits under a RP mechanism are equivalent to total profits under a NR
mechanism, i.e. ΠRP = ΠNR.
Government expenditure is given by:
GRP = (1− θ)
(
















Parameter restrictions As in the FPR mechanism case, equations (31), (32) and (33)
must hold for our results to be verified. In the latter case of equation (33), the condition is less
restrictive because of the equivalence between the RP and NR mechanisms, which implies that
θ = 1 in equation (33).
5 Market impact of the pseudo-generic
Rodrigues et al. (2011) show, in their Proposition 1, that the presence of a pseudo-generic raises
the prices of all pharmaceuticals in a setting with no reimbursement mechanism. We extend this
result by claiming that:
Proposition 1 For parameter values satisfying equations (31), (32) and (33), the presence of a
pseudo-generic raises the headline price of the branded and generic varieties under both reimburse-
ment regimes (FPR and RP).
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Proof. Under a FPR mechanism with θ > 0, pFPRb > p
FPR
b is equivalent to requiring that
β > γ − 7t+ 5tfI ; in order for pFPRg > pFPRg , β > γ − t+ tfI . Both hold for any β > γ, t > 0 and
fI ∈ (0, 1) .
Under a RP mechanism, headline prices are equivalent to a no reimbursement scenario, as













g for any β > γ, t > 0 and fI ∈ (0, 1) .
From a consumer’s perspective, although the headline prices are not fully borne because of the
reimbursement mechanisms, we can still state that:
Proposition 2 Under both reimbursement mechanisms (FPR and RP), and assuming equations
(31), (32) and (33) hold, consumer surplus is lower when a pseudo-generic is present in the market.
Proof. Under a FPR mechanism, consumer surplus with a pseudo-generic is given by equation
(10), whilst equation (25) contains the expression for consumer surplus with no pseudo-generic. In
order for CSFPR − CSFPR < 0, the following must be verified:
CSFPR − CSFPR =
(β − γ) [5 (β − γ)− 22t− 18tfI ]−
(





The denominator is always positive; hence, a suffi cient condition for the expression to be
negative is for both terms in the numerator to be negative. Starting with the second term,(
71− 86fI + 61f2I
)
t2, it is always negative for any t > 0 and fI ∈ (0, 1) ; as for the first term,
(β − γ) > 0 (by assumption) and in order for 5 (β − γ)− 22t− 18tfI < 0 the following must hold:







This is less restrictive than equation (31) and hence always satisfied when equation (31) is
active.
Under a RP mechanism, consumer surplus with and without a pseudo-generic is given by equa-
tions (34) and (16) respectively. CSRP − CSRP is given by:
CSRP − CSRP =
(β − γ) [5 (β − γ) + (2− 24θ) t− 18tfI ]−
(





The denominator is always positive; the second term in the numerator is always negative for
any θ > 1 and 2/5 < fI < 5/8, as equation (32) is active; in order for the first term to be negative,
the following must hold:













This is less restrictive than equation (31) provided fI > 31/94, which is satisfied when the
restriction embodied in equation (32) is active.
Reference pricing, from the consumers viewpoint, is clearly better than the FPR mechanism,
but it is particularly advantageous when a pseudo-generic is sold in the market:
Proposition 3 Assuming equations (31), (32) and (33) hold, reference pricing yields a higher
consumer surplus than a fixed percentage reimbursement mechanism, but the difference between the
two is larger when a pseudo-generic is present in the market.
Proof. Reference pricing leads to a higher consumer surplus than the FPR mechanism, as we
can see from the following expressions::
CSRP − CSFPR = 1− θ
3
[t− (β − γ)] > 0
CSRP − CSFPR = t (1− θ) (fI + 2)
3
> 0 (41)
The first expression is clearly positive because equation (13) holds, i.e. (β − γ) < t; the second
expression is always positive for any t > 0, θ < 1 and fI ∈ (0, 1) . The rationale is straightforward:
headline prices are equal under a RP or a NR mechanism, but in the latter the consumer supports
the full price of pharmaceuticals whilst under RP he only supports part of it, thus lowering effective
prices.
Comparing the increases in consumer surplus arising from the introduction of reference pricing











[t+ (β − γ) + tfI ] (42)
This expression is positive for any θ < 1, t > 0, β > γ and fI ∈ (0, 1) .
This result suggests, from a consumer’s viewpoint, that there is particular merit in introducing
reference pricing when a pseudo-generic is present, as this leads to a more significant increase in
consumer surplus (relative to a FPR mechanism). Alternatively, within a FPR mechanism, this
result indicates a more pressing need for price regulation when a pseudo-generic is present.
6 Welfare analysis
Inevitably, the relative merits of each reimbursement mechanism should not be assessed solely by
looking at their effects on consumer surplus. Social welfare (SW) - the sum of consumer and
producer surplus minus government expenditure with pharmaceuticals - is a more encompassing
welfare measure.
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Proposition 4 Assuming equations (31), (32) and (33) hold, social welfare in a setting with no
pseudo-generic is equal regardless of the reimbursement mechanism; the same is true in a set-
ting with a pseudo-generic, i.e. SWNR = SWFPR = SWRP and SWNR = SWFPR = SWRP
respectively.
Proof. Without a pseudo-generic, social welfare in the case of a FPR mechanism is given by
SWFPR = CSFPR + ΠFPR −GFPR. As we can see from equation (10), CSFPR = CSNR, because
consumer surplus does not depend on θ. Additionally, ΠFPR = 1θΠ
NR and GFPR = 1−θθ Π
NR.
Hence:




ΠNR − 1− θ
θ
ΠNR
= CSNR + ΠNR = SWNR (43)
Under reference pricing, equation (41) tells us that CSRP = CSFPR + 1−θ3 [t− (β − γ)] =
CSNR + 1−θ3 [t− (β − γ)] . As we have seen in Section 3.2, total profits under reference pricing are
equal to a no reimbursement scenario, i.e. ΠRP = ΠNR. Finally, government expenditure is given
by equation (18). Therefore:




[t− (β − γ)] + ΠNR − (1− θ)
3
[t− (β − γ)]
= CSNR + ΠNR = SWNR (44)
When a pseudo-generic is present, SWFPR = CSFPR + ΠFPR − GFPR. From equation (25),
we know that CSFPR = CSNR. Equation (26) tells us that ΠFPR = 1θΠ
NR whilst government
expenditure, from equation (27), is simply GFPR = 1−θθ Π
NR. Hence:




ΠNR − 1− θ
θ
ΠNR
= CSNR + ΠNR = SWNR (45)
Under reference pricing, equation (41) tells us that CSRP = CSFPR + t(1−θ)(fI+2)3 = CS
NR +
t(1−θ)(fI+2)
3 whilst equation (35) tells us that Π
RP = ΠNR. Finally, government expenditure is given
by equation (36), which yields:
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SWRP = CSRP + ΠRP −GRP
= CSNR +
t (1− θ) (fI + 2)
3
+ ΠNR − t (1− θ) (fI + 2)
3
= CSNR + ΠNR = SWNR (46)
This result is similar to Brekke et al. (2007) (Proposition 6). With or without a pseudo-generic,
it is particularly interesting to note that, under a FPR mechanism, pharmaceutical firms effectively
receive a public subsidy but consumers do not benefit from lower (effective) prices: the mark-up
of headline prices is fully borne by the government and hence this transfer (effectively a public
subsidy) is neutral from a social welfare perspective. This result clearly indicates the need for
pharmaceutical price regulation prior to inclusion in a FPR mechanism.
By contrast, under reference pricing, it is consumers who receive a public subsidy, which allows
them to increase their consumer surplus because they no longer bear the full headline price of
pharmaceuticals. From a social welfare perspective, this transfer is also neutral, because firms’
profits are equal to a NR scenario.
Brekke et al. (2007) suggest a different welfare measure which may be more relevant to countries
which do not have a significant pharmaceutical industry. In those cases, it is unlikely that profits
would enter the welfare function. Thus, welfare (W ) can be more narrowly defined in a public payer
perspective, only taking into account consumer surplus net of government expenditure. Following
this approach, we can state that:
Proposition 5 Assuming equations (31), (32) and (33) hold, WNR = WRP > WFPR andWNR =
WRP > WFPR, i.e. a FPR mechanism is worse than RP or NR from a public payer’s welfare
perspective. In addition, reference pricing is particularly advantageous relative to FPR when a









Proof. In a setting with no pseudo-generic, WFPR = CSFPR − GFPR = CSNR − 1−θθ Π
NR
whilstWRP = CSRP −GRP = CSNR (see proof of Proposition 4). Hence, WNR = WRP > WFPR.
When a pseudo-generic is present, WFPR = CSFPR − GFPR = CSNR − 1−θθ Π
NR, whereas




















, it is suffi cient to demonstrate that ΠRP > ΠRP ,
provided 0 < θ < 1 :
ΠRP −ΠRP = 1
36t
[





The latter term is always positive. Hence, the expression is positive provided 29t2+10t (β − γ)−
26t2fI + 13t
2f2I − 18tfI (β − γ) > 0. For fI < 5/9 this is equivalent to requiring that:
β > γ +
t
(




The denominator is positive for fI < 5/9, but the numerator is always negative and hence any
β > γ satisfies this inequality. When fI > 5/9,requiring that 29t2+ 10t (β − γ)− 26t2fI + 13t2f2I −
18tfI (β − γ) > 0 is equivalent to requiring that:
β < γ +
t
(




This is less restrictive than equation (31) and hence always satisfied if this restriction is active.
Intuitively, reference pricing brings about a more significant increase in welfare from a public
payer’s perspective (or, equivalently, a more significant reduction in government expenditure),
compared to a FPR mechanism, when a pseudo-generic is present. This is because under a FPR
mechanism, as we have seen, prices and profits are ‘marked-up’relative to a RP mechanism. If, as
we show, total profits (or total pharmaceutical expenditure) are higher when a pseudo-generic is
present, then this ‘mark-up’will necessarily be higher in absolute terms. Hence, the introduction
of reference pricing, by eliminating this ‘mark-up’, will bring about a more significant increase in
welfare in that setting.
7 Conclusion
This paper extends the analysis of Rodrigues et al. (2011) by looking at two widely adopted re-
imbursement mechanisms: a fixed percentage reimbursement mechanism and a reference pricing
mechanism. In particular, in a setting encompassing both vertical product differentiation (between
branded and non-branded pharmaceuticals) and horizontal product differentiation (between gener-
ics) a number of interesting results are uncovered. First, under either reimbursement mechanism,
the results of Rodrigues et al. (2011) hold: the presence of a pseudo-generic raises the prices of all
pharmaceuticals and can be used as a tool to soften competition between the branded and generic
pharmaceutical producers. In addition, reference pricing is shown to bring about lower prices and
thus higher consumer surplus than FPR mechanisms, but this effect is more significant when a
pseudo-generic is present. Second, from a welfare perspective, our results are equivalent to those
of Brekke et al. (2007): if firms’profits are excluded from the analysis - a public payer’s welfare
perspective in countries where the pharmaceutical industry is absent - reference pricing is also supe-
rior to FPR. Lastly, we further show that this difference is larger when a pseudo-generic is present,
which implies that, in this case, adopting reference pricing would be particularly advantageous.
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Alternatively, if a pseudo-generic is present, this suggests a more pressing need for price regulation
within a FPR mechanism.
This analysis can be extended to a third possible, and to the best of our knowledge yet under-
researched, reimbursement mechanism: asymmetric fixed percentage reimbursement, through which
the reimbursement rates are different for different types of pharmaceuticals, with generics typically
attracting higher reimbursement (lower copayment) rates. This type of mechanism has been used,
for instance, in Portugal in order to help increase generic penetration at an early development
stage. Whilst this type of mechanism introduces more complexity in the analysis, it may also have
the merit to uncover more intricate details of firms’pricing incentives.
In addition, when a pseudo-generic is present, we have assumed that transportation costs (or
product substitutability) are equal for all generics (including the pseudo-generic). This may not
be a plausible assumption: generally, the identity of the producer is visible in the product and
the pseudo-generic may thus be considered, by consumers, to be ‘better’ (closer to the branded
product) than other generics. These are likely to be the next steps in our research.
References
[1] Brekke, K., Königbauer, I. and Straume, O. (2007), “Reference pricing of pharmaceuticals”,
Journal of Health Economics, 46, 613—642.
[2] Brekke, K., Grasdal, A. and Holmå, T. (2009), “Regulation and pricing of pharmaceuticals:
Reference pricing or price cap regulation?”, European Economic Review, 53, 170—185.
[3] López-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy, J. (2000), “Review of the literature on reference pricing”,
Health Policy, 54, 87—123.
[4] Merino-Castelló, A. (2003), “Impact of the Reference Pricing Systemon the Pharmaceutical
Market: A Theoretical Approach”, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Working Paper 524a.
[5] Miraldo, M. (2009), “Reference pricing and firms’pricing strategies”, Journal of Health Eco-
nomics, 28 , 176—197.
[6] Rodrigues, V., Gonçalves, R. and Vasconcelos, H. (2011), “Anticompetitive impact of pseudo-
generics”, mimeo.
18
